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• Connections between climate change and population are complex and controversial. 
There are diverse viewpoints amongst scholars, and debates are ongoing, especially 
around population ethics and modelling of population dynamics in climate change 
models. Many sensitivities remain, especially around links to “population control.” 
• Rapid population growth in Africa is seen as having a big effect on human development, 
provision of basic services, food security and poverty eradication. Climate change is 
thought to amplify these issues. Non-climatic drivers (especially population change) are 
likely to have a stronger impact overall on current and short-term future vulnerability risks 
in Africa than climate change (such as to food and water security and land degradation). 
• Areas of high population growth, high fertility, and high unmet family planning needs in 
Africa overlap with regions of high climate vulnerability in places. For example, in parts of 
the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and central Africa. Rapid population growth has a negative 
impact on the resilience of communities and their ability to adapt to climate change (as 
acknowledged in some country’s Nationally Determined Contributions and National 
Adaptation Plans). Climate vulnerability reflects existing gender inequalities and 
exacerbates existing socially constructed power relations, norms and practices.  
• It is generally argued that key population-related policy levers (women’s empowerment, 
girls’ education, family planning and reproductive health services) would be beneficial 
alongside a suite of other climate policies in Africa.  
• Scholarly, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of family planning and reproductive 
health initiatives on climate change is relatively scarce. There is a burgeoning literature 
on the theorised benefits and connections. Case studies from grey and donor literature 
are more apparent for adaptation, resilience and environmental protection. This is 
particularly true for population-health-environment (PHE) initiatives supported by USAID. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that family planning improves the likelihood of 
beneficial environmental outcomes regardless of its impact on population trends.  
• There is some agreement within the literature that girls’ education (both access to and 
quality of) is positive for both adaptation and mitigation. Education can positively affect 
adaptive capacity, increasing resilience. Girls’ education (especially to secondary level) 
has also been put forward as one of the most cost-effective mitigation strategies, 
alongside family planning – with these being seen as complementary.  
• Fertility reduction is unlikely to be an adequate core approach to climate mitigation 
globally, but may have an impact in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) due to its high enough 
fertility rates. However, SSA currently has low emissions per capita, making policies 
around fertility reduction unlikely to be a promising use of scarce political capital and 
policy attention. It may be more appropriate in resilience-building and adaptation efforts. 
• Existing climate frameworks have largely ignored the role of population dynamics and the 
potential for girls’ education, family planning and better reproductive health care to 
contribute to resilience and adaptation (and to a lesser degree emissions reduction). 
Growing opportunities for family planning and education to be included as part of 
multisectoral adaptation programmes.  
• Scholars in favour of family planning as being beneficial to climate action, emphasise the 
sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) rhetoric and call for voluntary family 
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planning and sexual health services based on women’s right to choose whether and 
when to have children. The need for increased investment and priority of family planning 
and their wider benefits ought to be emphasised in a sensitive way.  
1. Summary 
Population ethics1, especially in relation to climate change, is a very complicated and sensitive 
area with ongoing debates, and it is important to bear this in mind during this report. There still 
remains some foundational questions in population ethics, which concerns how we should 
evaluate future scenarios in which the number of people, their welfare, and their identities may 
vary (Bowman & Berndt Rasmussen, 2020). There are also climate justice issues in relation to 
population change and climate change, which concerns the just distribution of the burdens and 
benefits of climate change and climate policy, both intra- and intergenerationally. Then there are 
further issues around how to apply normative theories into practice with the circumstances of 
climate change, in light of both uncertainty and practical constraints (see Bowman & Berndt 
Rasmussen (eds), 2020 for in depth discussions of climate ethics). This rapid review is unable to 
explore these areas in detail given the breadth and complexity of issues. The review touches on 
some of these ethical issues and the linkages between population change and climate change 
generally, it focuses in on Africa, highlighting where “hotspots” of climate impacts and population 
change are predicted to coincide across the continent. The areas of climate mitigation, 
adaptation and policy responses in relation to population change are then touched on, with focus 
on women’s empowerment, girls’ education and family planning. 
This rapid review utilised both grey and academic literature. There is a large and growing 
literature on the linkages between population change and climate change (mitigation, adaptation, 
resilience and policy); although robust, empirical evidence remains lacking. Given the rapid 
nature of this review and the complex nature of the subject, only a snapshot of the literature 
could be given.  
Other key findings in addition to those highlighted above include: 
• Climate change ‘‘hotspots’’ (i.e. strong climate change signal and high concentration of 
vulnerable people) in Africa include arid/semi-arid regions, low-lying deltas and cities in 
Africa. Regions with severest projected climate change impacts often coincide with 
regions of high population density and poverty rates (Müller et al., 2014). For example, 
low-lying deltas and cities are typically heavily populated and face climate vulnerabilities 
from sea level rise, extreme heat, and natural disasters. Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Abuja, 
Lagos, Addis Ababa and Luanda all have high projected population growth and are 
among the African cities most at risk from climate change (Verisk Maplecroft, 2018). 
• There is a general lack of well-documented, empirical evidence for the specific impact of 
family planning and sexual health on climate change adaptation. One reason for this is 
because the evidence is difficult to collect. However, there is much literature in this area 
more generally supporting the theoretical linkages (and logics) between the two fields.  
 
1 Population ethics “asks when and whether an increase or decrease in the size of the population is a social 
improvement, or would be a good goal for policy to pursue” (Budolfson & Spears, 2020, p. 200). 
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• The value of gender equity and women’s empowerment in environmental outcomes is 
generally recognised. 
• Education can positively affect the adaptive capacity of an individual, increasing their 
resilience. Education (particularly girls’ education and to secondary education level) is 
found to be the most important socio-economic determinant to reduce vulnerability to 
natural disasters (Streissnig et al., 2013). Girls’ education (especially to secondary level) 
has also been put forward as one of the most cost-effective mitigation strategies, 
alongside family planning – and these are seen as complementary.  
• Combined population-health-environment initiatives appear to provide synergies above 
and beyond more traditional singular efforts, especially in maternal and child health. 
Effective collaboration with health partners, cultural sensitivity and local buy-in are key to 
PHE success. However, there is scant scholarly evidence on the effectiveness of 
integrated PHE initiatives (Lopez-Carr & Ervin, 2017).  
• There is little attention by the international community to the potential of population-
related policies to reduce risks from climate change (Arrhenius et al., 2020; Dodson et 
al., 2020). It is generally excluded from the UNFCCC discourse. O’Sullivan (2018) 
highlights that discussions of the risk population growth poses to heightened climate 
change impacts is considered taboo by the UN and development community since the 
adoption of the Cairo Agenda (i.e. the UN Programme of Action) at the 1994 International 
Conference on Population and Development, which called for the emphasis of 
reproductive health and rights over demographic aims. Although there is widespread 
agreement among governments and international organisations that family planning 
programmes are a valuable investment, they are often given low priority. 
• There is a recognised need for further research (Dodson et al., 2020), especially basic 
and applied research around the efficacy of national population-related policies in the 
context of climate impacts. Donors are starting to react to this (for example Denmark). 
More detailed modelling of the impact of different population trajectories within countries 
on expected climate impacts is also needed. Need for cross-sectoral collaborative 
research between climate experts and family planning and SRHR professionals.  
• A key sensitivity is that voluntary family planning programmes are largely aimed at high-
fertility low and middle income countries, with relatively low per capita emissions, while 
people in high income countries, which are primarily responsible for causing the climate 
to change, continue their excessive emission of greenhouse gases (Bongaarts & O'Neill, 
2018, p. 652). The call for a human rights–based approach (i.e. for women everywhere to 
have the right to freely choose when and how often to get pregnant) helps with these 
concerns to a degree.   
2. Population ethics and climate change 
Projected population changes in Africa  
The population of Africa is projected to double from 1.2 billion in 2020 to 2.4 billion by 2050 
(Population Council, 2020). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) continues to have a high fertility rate 
(although this has fallen between 1990 and 2019). UN DESA (2019) estimates that the countries 
of SSA could account for more than half of the growth of the world’s population between 2019 
and 2050 (over one billion people) and continue growing through the end of the century. The 
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Northern Africa region is also projected to continue growing through the end of the century, 
although at a slower rate to SSA. By contrast, populations in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, 
Central and Southern Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Northern America 
are projected to reach peak population size and to begin to decline before the end of this century.  
Figure 1: Population by SDG region: estimates, 1950-2020, and medium-variant projection with 
95% prediction intervals, 2020-2100 
 
Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2019, p. 7). Available under CC BY 3.0 IGO. *excludes Australia and 
New Zealand 
With a total fertility rate of 4.8 births per woman, Africa is the fasted growing continent at 2.7% 
per year (Beegle & Christiaensen, 2019). Its demographic transition is slow compared to other 
regions, although fertility rates have started to fall – in some countries much more than others.2 
As a result, SSA is projected to become the most populous of the eight geographic regions 
around 2062 (UNDESA, Population Division, 2019, p. 6 – see Figure 1 above). Several of the 
world’s largest countries will drive much of the anticipated global population change between 
2019 and 2050, including Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
 
2 See Quak, E. & Tull, K. (2020). Evidence of successful interventions and policies to achieve a demographic 
transition in sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Malawi. K4D Emerging Issues Report No.30, Brighton, 
UK: Institute of Development Studies. https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/15426  
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and Egypt. Almost 60% of Africa’s population is under the age of 25 (Population Council, 2020). 
Such young age structures mean that populations will continue to grow for some time, even after 
attaining replacement level fertility. Recent reductions in fertility in SSA mean that the population 
at working ages (25 to 64 years) is growing faster than in other age groups, providing an 
opportunity for accelerated economic growth (i.e. “demographic dividend”) (UN DESA, 2019). 
Poverty remains a major issue in Africa. The World Bank’s report Accelerating Poverty Reduction 
in Africa (Beegle & Christiaensen, 2019), finds that the share of Africans living in extreme poverty 
has fallen substantially (from 54% in 1990 to 41% in 2015), but due to high population growth 
during the same period, the number of poor people in Africa has actually increased from 278 
million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015. Given current conditions, the poverty rate is expected to 
decline to 23% only by 2030 and global poverty is estimated to become increasingly African, 
rising from 55% in 2015 to 90% in 2030. 82% of people living in extreme poverty in Africa live in 
rural areas and earn money primarily from farming. Fragile and conflict-affected states have 
notably higher poverty rates (Beegle & Christiaensen, 2019).  
Dodson et al. (2020, p. 2) highlights that fertility rates can be influenced by policies, but that there 
are many factors that influence fertility rates indirectly (e.g. average education level, economic 
growth, urbanisation, child mortality, cultural factors, social norms on ideal family size) and 
directly (e.g. presence of family planning programmes, availability of modern contraception and 
contraception use rates). Collectively these factors determine fertility levels of a country. 
However, the use of improved family planning programmes to reduce population growth remains 
controversial in many countries – with key issues often being the belief that “women's 
reproductive decisions largely should remain under the control of men (MacQuarrie et al., 2015), 
and that children are “up to God” (May, 2017)” (Dodson et al., 2020, p. 2). Dodson et al. (2020, p. 
2) put forward the need for “rights-based family planning, which enables all individuals to have 
the information, education and means to decide the number and spacing of their children 
responsibly.” Emphasising the need for voluntary measures.   
Climate change hotspots in Africa 
Africa has been identified as one of the most vulnerable parts of the world to the impacts of 
climate change (IPCC, 2014). There has been a plethora of studies into the variety of potential 
impacts of climate change on physical systems and human systems in Africa, and the complex 
connections between these, acknowledging that changes are not uniform across the region (see 
for example, Serdeczny et al., 2017 for a summary of these changes). Serdeczny et al. (2017, p. 
1596) summarise that generally: 
“East Africa is at higher risk of flooding and concurrent health impacts and infrastructure 
damages. West Africa is projected to experience severe impacts on food production, 
including through declines in oceanic productivity, with severe risks for food security and 
negative repercussions for human health and employment. South Africa sees the 
strongest decrease in precipitation with concurrent risks of drought. Sea-level rise puts at 
risk a growing number of densely populated coastal cities, whose population is set to 
increase and may receive yet more in-migration as a result of rural livelihood 
degradation.”  
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All these potential impacts are further complicated by variations across different sectors and 
population dynamics and localities, all of which are associated with great uncertainties, further 
complicating adaptation planning and decision-making (Serdeczny et al., 2017, p. 1596).   
INFRAS (Steinemann et al., 2020) produced a climate change foresight analysis for the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) on short- and medium-term climate-related 
risks (of 1–3 years). The climate-related hotspots3 and risks highlighted are a result of a 
combination of climate change and variability, exposure and vulnerabilities of people and 
ecosystems and their ability to address those risks (readiness, adaptive capacity, etc.). The 
analysis is based on the ND-Gain Index, which measures vulnerability including exposure in life 
supporting sectors on the one hand, and economic, governance and social readiness on the 
other hand.  
The analysis highlights hotspots with high climate-related risks in large parts of Africa – 
particularly the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region, which are amongst the countries with highest 
fertility rates (see Figure 17 in UNDESA, Population Division, 2019, p. 26 for global map of total 
fertility). The analysis highlights that non-climatic drivers (including population change) 
have a stronger effect on current and short-term future vulnerability risks than climate 
variability and change (Steinemann et al., 2020, p. 8). Particularly vulnerable areas for climate 
change include4:  
• Arid and semi-arid areas are extremely vulnerable to climatic trends (especially 
reduced, erratic or heavy precipitation and increased drought frequency and intensity). In 
these water scarce areas, for example North Africa and the Sahel, agriculture (crops or 
livestock) dependent on water or rain-fed irrigation are at risk (Steinemann et al., 2020, p. 
7). It is thought that climate change will amplify the existing stress on water resources 
from population growth, urbanisation, agricultural growth and land use change, which will 
remain key drivers to water scarcity in the future in North Africa, the Sahel, Horn of 
Africa, and South West Africa (Steinemann et al., 2020, pp. 12-13, 20). Although there is 
uncertainty over water resource projections. In West Africa in particular, there remains 
great uncertainty about future rainfall projections (Steinemann et al., 2020, p. 24). 
• Low-lying coastal areas and cities are prone to coastal hazards and sea level rise. 
Given the high population densities in many coastal areas and growing urban 
populations, exposure and hence the risks are particularly high and increasing. This is 
the case for parts of East and Southern Africa (Mombasa, Dar-es-Salaam, Maputo – the 
population in the region is expected to grow by more than 2% per year in the next 10 
years) and North Africa (where the highest (growing) population densities and the major 
cities are concentrated along the Mediterranean coast, in particular the Nile delta in 
Egypt) (Steinemann et al., 2020, p. 7).  
• In regions affected by compound or sequential events – such as severe drought 
followed by extreme rainfall or the sequential occurrence of several hurricanes – risks are 
particularly high both in human and natural systems. Droughts followed by floods were 
 
3 Hotspots are usually defined as areas where strong climate signal and high concentrations of vulnerable people 
are present. 
4 It is important to acknowledge the uncertainties and complexities around climate change projections and 
downscaling to country/local levels. The impacts highlighted by Steinemann et al (2020) draw on a large array of 
sources, but provide quite high-level, regional overviews of risks.  
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reported in the last two years in parts of East and Southern Africa (Sudan, Somalia, 
Burundi, Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi, Eswatini, Djibouti, Zambia and Zimbabwe). 
Mozambique was hit by two major tropical cyclones in the same season (Idai, Kenneth) 
in 2019 (Steinemann et al., 2020, p. 7). 
• Countries with persisting conflicts often have high climate-related risks, given that 
climate has complex interaction with various drivers of conflicts and instability (water 
scarcity or food insecurity). High political instability may further affect people’s ability to 
cope with possible future climate shocks. Conflicts persist to minor extents in parts of the 
Sahel (Lake Chad Basin, Central Mali) (Steinemann et al., 2020, p. 7). 
• Regions with long-term unsustainable resource management practices, overuse of 
scarce land and water resources, environmental degradation and increasing demand due 
to population growth are putting pressure on natural systems and are strongly influencing 
current climate-related risks. In almost all regions with high climate-related risks, non-
climatic drivers have a stronger effect on current risks than climate variability and 
change. Examples include the depletion of aquifers in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region (Steinemann et al., 2020, p. 8). 
An earlier study by Müller et al. (2014) modelling climate change hotspots, highlights large river 
catchments of Congo, Niger, Nile, and Zambezi as being hotspots for water-related climate 
change impacts. The study highlights Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the Lake 
Victoria region as climate change hotspots of high relevance for adaptation planning due to high 
exposure to climate change impacts, high population density and high poverty rates. 
Analysis by Verisk Maplecroft (2018) combined new UN projections on rates of annual population 
growth in over 1800 cities with subnational data from their Climate Change Vulnerability Index 
(CCVI) to assess the threat from climate change over the next 30 years. Their data found that of 
the 100 fastest growing cities by population, 84 are rated ‘extreme risk’, with a further 14 in the 
‘high risk’ category. Africa has 86 of the 100 fastest growing cities in terms of population; with 79 
of these rated ‘extreme risk’ in the CCVI (including 15 African capitals and many of the 
continent’s key commercial hubs). Among the most at risk of climate change include: Kampala in 
Uganda, where the annual population is set to grow by 5.1% a year on average between 2018-
35; Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania (4.8%), Abuja (4.5%) and Lagos (3.5%) in Nigeria; Addis Ababa 
(4.3%) in Ethiopia; and Luanda (3.7%) in Angola. 
Population distribution and movement 
The displacement of people is generally projected to increase under continued climate change 
(IPCC, 2014). Serdeczny et al. (2017, p. 1594) highlight that drivers of migration are complex 
and multiple, including cultural, economic, and political factors as well as non-climatic 
environmental factors. Local context is key and responses to the same type of climatic driver can 
vary considerably. In particular, SSA is expected to be “affected by migration associated with 
climate change-related drivers, including sea-level rise and declining or disrupted availability of 
resources” (Gemenne, 2011 cited in Serdeczny et al., 2017, p. 1594). Most forced migration due 
to environmental factors happens within countries.  
Africa has a high rate of rural-urban migration and urbanisation, and the trend can be 
exacerbated by the impacts of climate change. It is projected that half the population in SSA 
expected to live in urban areas by 2030 (UN-HABITAT, 2010 cited in Serdeczny et al., 2017, p. 
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1594). Migration itself can be seen as an adaptive response to local environmental risks, but is 
associated with other risks for both the migrant (such as high level of poverty and unemployment, 
dangerous living conditions, dependency on food sources) and the host community (pressure on 
natural resources).  
Differential vulnerability across Africa 
Climate vulnerability reflects existing gender inequalities and exacerbates existing socially 
constructed power relations, norms and practices (Kwauk et al., 2019). This includes gender 
roles and responsibilities that limit women’s activities and mobility to the home; traditions that 
constrain women’s access to land, financial credit and social capital; and women’s reduced 
access to information, knowledge and life-saving skills; all of which limit their ability to confront 
and adapt to climate shocks (Kwauk et al., 2019, p. 3). For example, intersecting vulnerabilities 
of age and gender shape the impact of climate change on girls and young women. There is not 
scope in this review to do justice to the differential vulnerabilities of different population groups to 
climatic impacts across Africa or the rich literature on multi-dimensional poverty and its effects on 
vulnerability. 
FAO (2018, p. 3), in an information booklet on tackling climate change through rural women’s 
empowerment, highlights how there are big differences in climate change impacts, vulnerabilities, 
responses and adaptive capacity between women and men depending on “individuals’ access to 
resources, assets, information, services and decision-making power.” The brunt of climate 
change impacts in poor countries are more often felt by women and girls. Gender-differential 
impacts of climate change in rural areas include greater food insecurity, as women are more 
likely to be food insecure then men. The burden of collecting of water and firewood in low-income 
countries usually falls on women and girls, having to travel long distances and putting them at 
risk of physical and sexual violence. Increased water scarcity impacts on household water 
provision meaning more time collecting water. Limited land ownership rights for women in many 
low and middle income countries also means limited user rights such as rights to plant trees and 
build soil control methods – important in helping to build resilience to climate change impacts. 
Women and children are 14 times more likely to die during natural disasters than men (FAO, 
2018, p. 7).  
“Vulnerable groups” is often used in climate change policies to indicate those most vulnerable to 
climate change impacts. Those most vulnerable can vary across countries and regions. Women 
in particular are recognised to be disproportionately impacted by climate change in Africa. Key 
institutions have made this recognition through various legislative, policy and strategic 
frameworks on climate change, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the African Union. A CCAFS working paper by Aura et al. (2017) 
undertakes a gender review of climate change legislative and policy frameworks and strategies in 
East Africa (focusing on the areas of climate-smart agriculture, food security, water, health, 
human rights and security). The review finds that all four East African countries reviewed (Kenya, 
Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia) include gender terms within their various policies, programmes, 
and plans. Within these there are a variety of groups identified as being vulnerable to climate 
change, these include:  
• Kenya: The Climate Change Act, No. 11 of 2016 identifies these just as “vulnerable 
people.” The National Climate Change Action Plan (2013) focuses on the urban poor 
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living in flood-prone slums and the rural poor, women, and children. The National 
Adaptation Plan (2016) identifies women, orphans and vulnerable children, the elderly, 
and persons with disability as vulnerable groups. The (I)NDC (2015) generally 
acknowledges vulnerable groups and youth (Aura et al., 2017, p. 24). 
• Uganda: The National Climate Change Policy (2012) identifies, women, older persons, 
and people with disabilities as vulnerable persons. The Agriculture Sector Development 
Strategy and Investment Plan (DISP) (2010) acknowledges internally displaced people, 
neglected children, orphans and refugees as being vulnerable groups. Women and youth 
are identified in the Climate Smart Agriculture Framework (2015) (Aura et al., 2017, p. 
33). 
• Tanzania: National Climate Change Strategy (2012) identifies marginalised groups, 
including women. National Adaptation Plan (2016) identifies youth and women groups. 
The Agriculture Climate Resilience Plan (2014) identifies women and girls as vulnerable. 
Climate Smart Agriculture Framework (2015) identifies women and youth (Aura et al., 
2017, p. 42). 
• Ethiopia: Climate Resilient Green Economy strategy (2011) identifies women as being 
vulnerable. The (I)NDC identifies vulnerable groups as being women, children farmers, 
pastoralists, elderly, persons with disabilities and refugees. Ethiopia’s Programme of 
Adaptation to Climate Change identifies women, children, elderly, disabled and poor 
people (Aura et al., 2017, p. 50). 
This demonstrates the array of vulnerability recognised in one country’s climate change policies. 
All the documents identified gender, vulnerable groups, and youth as the target groups most 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The documents also included gender 
mainstreaming and supported the enhancement of education, training, and capacity building for 
women. However, despite this, none of the documents mention direct benefits to women 
and youth or budget allocations for gender specific actions (Aura et al., 2017).  
3. Population ethics and modelling climate change 
A paper by Scovronick et al. (2017) looks at the “Impact of population growth and population 
ethics on climate change mitigation policy.” It asks how different population scenarios change the 
rationale for mitigation policies and vice versa. The paper highlights that it is not clear cut, and 
the answers importantly depend on ethical questions around how future populations are valued: 
namely, whether the goal is to increase the number of people who are happy (i.e. maximise total 
utility (TU)) or rather to increase the average level of people’s happiness (i.e. maximise average 
utility (AU)). This highlights the ethical difficulties that come with linking climate change and 
population change (for example, contentious ethical issues around family planning, abortion, and 
immigration), and the (unresolved) contradictions that inhabit the field of population ethics.  
As explained by Lutz (2017), the TU view indicates “a world with many more people, who on 
average have a lower level of wellbeing than today, would be better, if it results in a higher TU” 
(Lutz, 2017, p. 12103). This unsatisfactory conclusion has led to the proposing ways of dealing 
with it, with a focus on average welfare (AU) being the most popular alternative (i.e. need to 
improve the wellbeing of people alive rather than hypothetical larger populations). This AU 
approach has also received criticism among scholars.  
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Lutz (2017) highlights that most climate-economic models use a TU approach, this implies that “a 
much bigger future world population would be better (unless this is associated with much lower 
welfare per person), but also implies that damages caused by climate change to a bigger future 
population are more serious, and thus justify more costly mitigation action now than in the case 
of low population growth. Under an AU approach, population growth would be less relevant for 
mitigation costs.”  
Scovronick et al. (2017) shows that the difference in results of climate-economic models due to 
the TU vs. AU choice is as significant as that of the highly debated choice of discount rates. 
Questions on the suitability and usefulness of climate-economic models have also been raised in 
relation to real-world policy implications and priority setting. Lutz (2017) raises questions over 
other assumptions used in climate-economic models, including the use of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and income (GDI) as equating with human wellbeing and equity issues around 
this, and the treatment of humans as passive victims of climate change (ignoring human agency, 
adaptive capacity and the influence of factors such as better education).  
Lutz (2017) summarises the evidence showing that empowerment of women (and others) 
through education can actively contribute to raising their standards of living (better health and 
incomes) and adaptive capacity. Education of women is also key in voluntary fertility declines in 
high-fertility countries. “Hence, human agency associated with empowerment through education 
matters greatly for population growth, as well as for economic growth and for adaptive capacity to 
climate change” (Lutz, 2017, p. 12104). To represent this view of human agency quantitatively 
necessitates accounting for population heterogeneity in models (using age, gender, and 
education level).  
Over the past years, this view has been translated by scientists into alternative scenarios in the 
form of so-called shared-socioeconomic pathways (SSPs), which examine how global society, 
demographics and economics could evolve over the next century, and were used in the IPCC 
Fifth Assessment Report. Different population growth and human capital formation trajectories 
are associated with different pathways, and show that “future population growth is clearly not 
independent from the other socioeconomic trends that matter for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation” (Lutz, 2017, p. 12104). The “sustainability” scenario (SSP1 – see Figure 2 below) 
shows a rapid education expansion with a world population peaking at 8.5 billion around mid-
century, and is associated with higher average human wellbeing and likely lower mitigation and 
adaptation costs. Although most modelling currently goes to 2100, recent model calculations that 
go beyond 2100 (assuming that during the second half of this century all parts to the world will 
have fertility levels of 1.5–1.75) find that, “depending on life expectancy having a ceiling at 90 or 
120 years, world population in 2200 would come to lie within a range of 2–6 billion. But this would 
only be possible if Africa experienced a rapid education expansion followed by economic growth” 
(Lutz, 2017, p. 12104). There is criticisms of the SSPs, for example, that that they do not reflect 
adaptive capacity well due to the lack of inclusion of governance measurements (Andrijevic et al., 
2020).  
O’Sullivan (2018) explains that, although population projections are embedded, population 
growth is not a parameter included in projections of future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
in the anticipated impacts of climate change. She argues that population growth (and uncertainty 
around this) has been largely ignored in the literature as a factor affecting outcomes. Instead, 
population growth is assumed to be “governed by economic and educational advances” 
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(O’Sullivan, 2018, p. 103). For example, this is the case for family size outcomes in the “shared 
socioeconomic pathways” (SSPs) described in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, which tend 
to hide the role explicit policies will play in determining future fertility rates, such as family 
planning and girls’ education/empowerment (Dodson et al., 2020). In contrast, “sensitivity 
analyses have demonstrated population to be a dominant determinant of emissions” and “the 
assumption that population growth is determined by economic and educational settings is not 
well supported in historical evidence” (O’Sullivan, 2018, p. 103). Worryingly, O’Sullivan (2018, p. 
107) highlights the inconsistencies of the population projections used in the SSPs compared to 
the UN’s current population projections, with the majority of the SSPs using a projection well 
below the UN’s medium population projection (i.e. below the 95% probability range of the UN’s 
2015 probabilistic projections).  
Figure 2: A conceptual map of the five families of IPCC Shared Socioeconomic Pathways 
(SSPs), in relation to the strength of mitigation and adaptation challenges posed by each 
scenario (after van Vuuren et al., 2014). Approximate trends in population outcomes and 
emissions per capita outcomes are superimposed. Population growth is most strongly related to 
adaptation challenges. Source: O’Sullivan (2018, p. 106).5  
Another paper by Arrhenius et al. (2020, p.170) in a collection of essays on climate ethics, looks 
at the ethics and issues around choosing an effective policy response to climate change given 
the unresolved nature of population ethics (i.e. the view that “we do not know what to do about 
intergenerational policy until we know what to do about population ethics” (Arrhenius et al., 2020, 
p.170). This view is held by e.g. the IPCC. Arrhenius et al. (2020, p.171) argue that enough may 
already be known to make good choices about climate policy even without further progress in 
population ethics.  
4. General evidence base on the benefits of family planning 
to environmental sustainability 
A literature review by Engelman et al. (2016) from the Family Planning and Environmental 
Sustainability Assessment (FPESA) project of the Worldwatch Institute, explored peer-reviewed 
scientific literature published between 2005 through early 2016 to explore the hypothesis that 
family planning benefits environmental sustainability. Note that the project was broader than just 
climate change and was looking at environmental sustainability. The paper found that:  
• There was generally a lack of direct consideration of this hypothesis, and so no “scientific 
consensus is apparent in the literature.” Therefore, the paper could not confirm the 
hypothesis; however, the majority of the evidence from the papers reviewed supported it 
(Engelman et al., 2016, p. 1).  
• The overwhelming majority of researchers who explore relationships between 
population growth and environmental degradation or resource scarcity either find 
empirically or assert that the former is an influential factor in the latter, although 
 
5 “Synergy between Population Policy, Climate Adaptation and Mitigation” - Scientific Figure on ResearchGate. 
Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/A-conceptual-map-of-the-five-families-of-IPCC-Shared-
Socioeconomic-Pathways-SSPs-in_fig1_320632925 [accessed 12 November 2020]. 
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often interacting in complex ways with other factors. A handful of papers argue that the 
role of population is exaggerated or insignificant (Engelman et al., 2016, p. 1). 
• “Access to and use of family planning—specifically effective modern 
contraception—reduces fertility and facilitates delayed and more widely spaced 
childbirths, slowing population growth” (Engelman et al., 2016, p. 14).  
• “Slowing population growth tends to lessen the risk of dangerous environmental 
changes and to enhance the potential for societal resilience to climate change, 
water scarcity, food insecurity, the loss of biological diversity, and related threats” 
(Engelman et al., 2016, p. 14). 
• “By reducing unintended pregnancy and facilitating personal choices on the 
number and timing of births, family planning expands opportunities available to 
women and girls. This enables them to contribute more actively to environmental 
activities and to societal resilience” (Engelman et al., 2016, p. 14). 
• “A sizable minority of authors mentions family planning in relation to the 
population-environment connection, often calling for improvements in access or 
services as one way to slow environmental degradation or increases in resource 
scarcity. This perspective is widely shared geographically, with African authors more 
likely than those of any other continent to call for improved family planning services” 
(Engelman et al., 2016, p. 2). 
• “Some papers contribute evidence that family planning improves the likelihood of 
beneficial environmental outcomes regardless of its impact on fertility and 
population trends. The linkages in this case are multiple and complex, relating to life 
options for women that managing the timing of pregnancy may open up. A greater range 
of opportunities on which to spend their time and energy may then enable women so 
inclined to contribute more than would otherwise be possible to environmental 
sustainability and societal resilience. Separately, some literature documents ways in 
which women tend to be more concerned about the environment and to take action to 
protect it” (Engelman et al., 2016, p. 2).  
• Another key finding was that population growth had a larger impact overall than climate 
change on water scarcity, land degradation, and food insecurity (Engelman et al., 2016, 
p. 2). Furthermore, food security is undermined by high fertility, with 3 of the 
reviewed articles (all by African authors) finding strong correlations between household 
size and food insecurity in the areas of Africa that they studied (Engelman et al., 2016, p. 
18). 
Investigation into the empirical connections between the use of family planning and the 
environment have received more attention since 2016, but research is still limited in comparison 
to the potential size of the subject. The paper highlights a key point that “population policy must 
be based on women’s right to choose whether and when to have children and that women and 
men should have equal rights and equal opportunities in every sphere of life” (Engelman et al., 
2016, p. 2). They also highlight the complexity of the connections between population growth and 
environmental change, their association with disparate scientific specialties, and acute 
sensitivities related to population and contraception. The paper concludes that there are “a wide 
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array of findings and views that can support family planning education and advocacy” (Engelman 
et al., 2016, p. 2), although caution needs to be taken with this conclusion.6  
5. Climate change mitigation 
Women’s empowerment and family planning 
The connections between demography and climate mitigation is complex. Lutz and Striessnig 
(2015, p. S70) summarise analyses of demographic drives of future carbon emissions as being 
driven “not just by population size but also by the distribution of the population by age, sex, 
education, place of residence, household size, and other relevant characteristics. Future 
societies, by any account, will be much older than present ones, they will be more urban, and 
they will be more educated. All of this affects lifestyles and consumption patterns, and also 
innovative potential.” 
As starkly highlighted in a working paper by Gerlagh et al. (2019), a quarter of the historical 
increase in greenhouse gas emissions is attributable to the growth of emissions per person, 
whereas three-quarters are due to population growth. Historically industrialised countries 
contributed most to emissions; however, future emissions growth is expected to be mainly driven 
by low and middle income countries characterised by high income growth and significant 
population growth.  
Although population growth is an important component of future emissions projections, 
population dynamics are not always well represented in climate-economic models, where they 
are typically taken to follow exogenous trends. The working paper focuses on the environmental 
impacts of individual’s reproductive choices, and developed “an analytical model of endogenous 
fertility and embed[ded] it in a calibrated climate-economy model” (Gerlagh et al, 2019, p.1). The 
paper highlights that endogenous fertility choices generate an externality (i.e. parents do not 
consider the contribution of each child to emissions when deciding on family size). They 
recognise that the environmental externality to childbearing is but one of a wide range of impacts 
that could be studied, and that “a newborn child also contributes to production when grown up” 
through their embedded human capital (Gerlagh et al., 2019, p.2).  
The paper investigate a number of scenarios to provide evidence on the size of the “population 
externality”; a social optimum scenario where both optimal carbon taxes and family planning 
policies are implemented and second best scenarios where only one tax at time is implemented. 
Their results point to the need for both carbon taxes and demographic policies (Gerlagh et al, 
2019, p.25). The paper presents family planning as being an integral part of climate policies, as 
family planning contributes to reducing emissions. Optimal family policy not only reduces the 
family size but also stimulates the parents to invest more in the education of their children (which 
increases human capital, stimulates growth, and reduces fertility). According to their model, 
including family planning means that global population peaks at 9 billion instead of the business-
 
6 The paper used a collaborative assessment network, and of the 495 authors of the (50) papers that were 
ranked as most relevant to their hypothesis, 133 were women and they estimate a similar proportion were 
authors based in or with roots in low and middle income countries. Furthermore, “Africans were the primary 
authors of nine out of 22 of the top-ranked papers that specifically called for better access to family planning in 
order to ameliorate environmental problems” (Engelman et al., 2016, p. 2). 
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as-usual 11 billion (Gerlagh et al, 2019, p.1). Their model is global and does not differentiate 
between regions, and is not detailed enough to explore differences between countries e.g. high 
income low-fertility countries.   
Dodson et al. (2020) highlights the ways that population change can be linked to climate change 
mitigation. Low population projections throughout the 21st century in economic models (as noted 
previously) rather than the UN medium variant (from 2004 UN projections) could reduce global 
carbon emissions from energy use by 40% (O'Neill et al., 2010 cited in Dodson et al., 2020, p. 4). 
Dodson et al. (2020) highlight work by Van Vuuren et al., 2018 that shows that “Slowing 
population growth is broadly comparable with other emission reduction strategies, [such as] 
renewable electrification by the end of the century.” Integrating efforts to lower population growth 
with other low-carbon strategies (such as renewable electrification, sustainable lifestyle changes) 
across multiple sectors is critical. Dodson et al. (2020) also highlight research that found 
prospective feedbacks in that “policies that reduce population growth could indirectly influence 
other emission drivers. For example, lowering fertility could stimulate economic growth, 
increasing per capita affluence and consumption, which could counterbalance some of the 
potential emission reductions” (O'Sullivan, 2013; Casey and Galor, 2017; O'Neill et al., 2010 all 
cited in Dodson et al., 2020, p. 7). 
O’Sullivan (2018) highlights the role of population-focused voluntary family planning programmes 
in attaining rapid fertility decline, even in poor communities. She argues that global peak 
population could peak below 9 billion if high-fertility nations adopted such programmes (rather 
than 13 billion by 2100 with current trends). She highlights evidence that economic advancement 
has not been a major driver of fertility decline, but rather fertility decline, driven by voluntary 
family planning programmes, has enabled economic advance (see also Schultz, 2015). For 
example, countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Costa Rica, where voluntary family 
planning was extended and promoted during 1970s-1990s, saw rapid fertility decline and 
subsequently accelerated broad-based economic development. Whereas, in other countries such 
as Indonesia, Bangladesh, Algeria and Ghana where family planning programmes were 
neglected before reaching replacement rate, the fertility decline stalled and, in some cases, 
reversed. She argues that rapid fertility decline has been associated with dramatic economic 
improvement. Presenting evidence that “reducing poverty as a population control strategy simply 
has not proven possible for most high-fertility countries” (O’Sullivan, 2018, p. 115).  
However, family planning programmes have been neglected in recent decades. O’Sullivan (2018, 
p. 116) notes that voluntary family planning currently receives less than 1% of international aid 
and programmes continue to lack the scale and visibility needed to reach the majority of 
disadvantaged people and achieve rapid fertility decline. Furthermore, an avoided birth has more 
impact on future population if it occurs sooner rather than later. O’Sullivan (2018) puts forward 
other co-benefits as including gender equity, environmental protection, and conflict avoidance. 
Coherent cross-sectoral programmes (between family planning, livelihoods, health, 
environmental management) can greatly increase community acceptance of family planning, 
overcoming cultural resistance (PAI et al., 2015 cited in O’Sullivan, 2018, p. 118). 
Wheeler and Hammer (2010) argued that avoiding unwanted births through investments in a 
combination of voluntary family planning and girls’ education would avoid GHG emissions at 
considerably lower cost than renewable energy initiatives, and lower than most reforestation 
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initiatives. This was true even in countries where per capita emissions are very low (such as in 
SSA). In more than 60 countries, the cost was less than US$10 per tonne.  
Dodson et al. (2020, p. 1) argue that “rights-based policy interventions [such as voluntary family 
planning programmes] could decrease fertility rates to levels consistent with low population 
pathways” and that these should be part of a multifaceted climate response.  
A common and key theme in the sources in favour of family planning as being beneficial to 
climate action is that the authors emphasise and call for voluntary family planning and 
sexual health services. Voluntary family planning does not have decreasing fertility as a 
primary goal, but is seen as a tool to allow families (and women in particular) to determine the 
number, timing and spacing of their children. Although modern contraceptive practice is on the 
rise in SSA overall, there is much geographic variation and contraceptive discontinuation rates 
are also high. SSA's family planning situation remains challenged by weak and underfunded 
health systems which must address competing priorities (Tsui et al., 2017). Integrated policies 
will be key that harness synergies between women’s empowerment, girls’ education and family 
planning and reproductive health services.  
Budolfson and Spears (2020, p. 199) as part of a set of essays on climate ethics, explore 
whether “fertility policy is likely to have a large effect on carbon emissions, and therefore on 
temperature change.” Their conclusion, given actual constraints on demographic change, 
governance, and policy-making attention, is that no it will not, as the effect of “fertility-reduction-
as-climate-mitigation” is limited by population momentum. They show that between now and 
2050 only a limited portion of world population growth can be influenced by policies that 
accelerate fertility decline (mainly concentrated in SSA). They modelled the possible effects of a 
hypothetical standalone climate fertility policy, and found that even if fertility rates change very 
quickly and mortality rates changed to replacement levels the world would still have a population 
level of over 9 billion by 2060 and temperature change would still peak at 6.4°C, relative to 7.1°C 
under the most likely population path.  
Therefore, accelerated fertility reduction (through voluntary or incentive-based policies) is 
unlikely to be an adequate core approach to climate mitigation globally. However, they 
highlight that of all the global regions, SSA is the only one which has scope in principle, 
for potential faster decline in rates with policy interventions due to its high enough fertility 
rates. However, it currently has low emissions per capita, making policies aimed at 
speeding up the fall in fertility rates unlikely to be a “promising use of scarce political 
capital and policy attention, [or] as a focal near-term tool of climate mitigation” given the 
near-term timeline that is relevant for climate policy (Budolfson & Spears, 2020, p. 213). 
Although they recognise that reduction in fertility rates as a result of human development policy 
might be valuable for other reasons, and may play a part in the response to climate change, they 
conclude that rapid and aggressive decarbonisation is what is needed as a policy priority to 
address climate change. 
Role of girls’ education 
Lutz and Striessnig (2015) emphasise that the role of education in mitigation is more complex 
than its role in adaptation. They argue that in high-fertility contexts (such as much of SSA), 
education impacts on fertility and hence reduces population growth, “mediated by a desire for 
smaller family sizes” (p. S71). On the other hand, education can be associated with increased 
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consumption and carbon emissions due to improved economic growth, affluence and reduced 
poverty. Although behavioural differences at given levels of income and education with more 
“green choices” may negate this potential increase. These demographic and behavioural factors 
evolve only slowly and gradually, whereas sustainable technological innovations offer more near-
term forces of successful mitigation. These technologies do not exist yet and “hope rests strongly 
on the future innovative potential of societies,” where it is generally agreed that a high general 
level of education will enlarge the pool of potential innovators (Lutz & Striessnig, 2015, p. S72). 
Wheeler and Hammer (2010, p.7) put forward girls’ education as being one of the most cost-
effectives strategies to mitigate carbon emissions. The econometric study drawing on data on 
carbon emissions, programme effectiveness and cost in low and middle income countries, 
estimated the costs of reducing carbon emissions via girls’ education (increased enrolment) and 
family planning. Their cost estimates are much lower than the cost estimates of other carbon 
emissions reduction options such as solar, wind and nuclear power, second-generation biofuels, 
carbon capture and storage and comparable with cost estimates for forest conservation and 
improvements in agricultural and forestry practices. Girls’ education (especially to secondary 
level) is connected to emissions reduction through an association between female schooling and 
three variables: life expectancy, income per capita and the total fertility rate (Wheeler & Hammer, 
2010, p. 7). In comparing family planning vs girls’ education, they find that abatement cost via 
family planning is generally lower in 70% of the countries studied. However, they emphasise that 
the two options are complementary rather than competitive.  
Costs 
Scovronick et al. (2017, SI Appendix, p. 9) highlights that quantitative comparison of costs 
between different climate policy options are also important. Although hypothetical future costs 
cannot be fully known, estimates from the literature can help us understand their general 
magnitude. Recent estimates put the spending shortfall for providing all women in Africa with 
access to modern Sexual and Reproductive Health care7 at about US$21.6 billion per year8 (in 
2019 US dollars) (Sully et al., 2020, p.47). Africa accounts for 61% of the projected US$31.1 
billion additional investment needed annually in low and middle income countries (Sully et al., 
2020, p. 47).  
The financing gap9 projected in 2015 for providing all children in low and lower-middle income 
countries with a quality education (SDG4) between 2015-2030 was estimated at US$39.5 billion 
annually (at constant 2012 prices). However, recent data projected in 2020 from UNESCO has 
now put this funding gap at US$148 billion annually between 2020-2030, with the increase due in 
part to the shorter time-span of reaching SDG4, slow progress before 2020, and improvements in 
data and quality standards (UNESCO, 2020).  
The COVID-19 pandemic has further aggravated education financing gaps, adding up to one-
third to the annual funding gap to reach as much as US$ 200 billion (UNESCO, 2020). It is 
 
7 I.e. investment over current costs required to fully meet the needs for contraceptive services, pregnancy-related 
and new-born care, and treatment for the four major curable STIs. 
8 Costs for Western Africa: US$ 8.2 billion; Eastern Africa: US$ 6.2 billion; Middle Africa: US$ 3.6 billion; Northern 
Africa: US$ 1.9 billion; Southern Africa: US$ 1.7 billion. 
9 I.e. the difference between the estimated cost of achieving basic education and the estimated domestic 
resources available (AfDB, 2020). 
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thought that Africa will account for a large proportion of the education financing gap, due to its 
low GDP per capita and high population growth rate (AfDB, 2020, p. 102). Africa is among the 
highest spenders on education in the developing world, at an average of 5% of national GDP, 
putting many countries on track to meet UNESCO’s target of providing universal primary 
education by 2030. And yet, Africa remains the world’s least efficient region at utilising education 
spending (AfDB, 2020, p. 102).10   
6. Climate change adaptation and resilience 
Dodson et al. (2020) highlight evidence around higher population growth being connected with 
greater human exposure to climate-related risks such as flooding and water stress. People in low 
and middle income countries are more vulnerable to climate risks and impacts, and are 
disproportionately exposed compared to people in high income countries. Pressure from a 
growing population can weaken a country’s adaptive capacity. With the interaction between 
climate and population “often the largest driver of future exposure, more important than changes 
in climate or population alone” (Dodson et al., 2020, p. 5). For some socioeconomic 
circumstance, “addressing population growth can be more effective than climate mitigation itself 
in minimizing climate-driven risks. For example, addressing population growth would be more 
effective than reducing emissions to minimize drought risk in developing African countries, since 
lower population paths reduce both socioeconomic vulnerability and exposure to drought” 
(Ahmadalipour et al., 2019 cited in Dodson et al., 2020, p. 5). As previously highlighted, some 
climate change ‘‘hotspots’’ have been identified in Africa where strong climate change signal, 
high population density and poverty rates (or vulnerability) coincide. These include arid/semi-arid 
regions, low-lying deltas and cities (Müller et al., 2014). Adaptive capacity within these areas are 
already often low. High rates of rural-urban migration and urbanisation in Africa, which are 
expected to increase in the future, may add to these vulnerabilities and increase pressure on 
adaptive capacity.  
Some studies have argued that “future regional food security and global water security are driven 
primarily by population increase raising demand, and only secondarily by climate change” (Hall et 
al., 2017; Smirnov et al., 2016 cited in Dodson et al., 2020, p. 5). This is because the increase in 
food demand from population growth will likely enhance climate impacts, as it increases 
emissions from the second-most GHG intensive sector (agriculture, forestry and other land use), 
necessitating greater adaptation to address food insecurities (Conijn et al., 2018 cited in Dodson 
et al., 2020, p. 5). Again Dodson et al. (2020) emphasise that population-related policies would 
work in tandem with adaptation technologies that, for example, increase crop production, mitigate 
wasteful consumption and improve infrastructure and management practices.  
Girls’ education 
Lutz and Striessnig (2015) highlight how adaptation and resilience to climate change that is 
unavoidable has been in sharper focus in recent years in the international community. Growing 
recognition has also been given to the need to consider demographic characteristics and 
 
10 See also Quak, E. (2020). The political economy of the primary education system in Tanzania. K4D Helpdesk 
Report No 710. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14998 
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capabilities in assessing vulnerability (i.e. differential vulnerability) rather than solely location. The 
role of educational composition of the population in affecting the future impact of climate change 
on humans and wellbeing has gained particular attention. Lutz and Striessnig (2015, p. S72) 
highlight that there is “strong evidence, both at the micro-level and the macro-level, of the risk-
reducing potential of education, which enables individuals to acquire knowledge, skills, and 
competencies that can influence their adaptive capacity and thus reduce risk.” Quality of 
education, and not just access to, is an important factor here.  
It has also been found that education (particularly girls’ education and to secondary education 
level) is the most important socio-economic determinant to reduce vulnerability to natural 
disasters. This was the finding of Striessnig et al. (2013) who used quantitative regression 
analysis covering data on past natural disaster fatalities from 125 low and lower middle income 
countries over the period 1980 to 2010 to investigate the effects of educational attainment on 
climate risk vulnerability. Using very rough, back-of-the-envelope calculations they estimated that 
if at least 70% of women between ages 20 and 39 achieved at least a lower-secondary 
education, disaster-related deaths in SSA could be reduced by 60% between 2040 and 2050 
(Streissnig et al., 2013, p. 5). 
Education (measured by the ratio of enrolment in tertiary education) is also an important social 
indicator included in the ND-GAIN index11 (a measure of a country’s resilience to climate 
disasters). Education is considered as an important strategy to build up adaptive capacity and 
identify adaptation solutions appropriate to local context. In particular, enrolment in secondary or 
tertiary education is a significant contributor, more than primary education, to adaptive capacity.12 
Kwauk and Braga. (2017, p. 18) using ND-GAIN Index data and UNDP data on the mean years 
of schooling for girls in 162 countries find that there is a strong positive association between 
average number of years of schooling a girl receives in her country and her country’s ND-GAIN 
index. That is, girls with high levels of schooling are more likely to live in countries less 
vulnerable to climate disasters, and girls with very little schooling are more likely to live in 
countries that are more vulnerable. For every additional year of schooling for a girl, her country’s 
ND-GAIN Index can be expected to improve by 3.2 points (Kwauk & Braga, 2017, p. 19). 
Kwauk et al. (2019, p. 5) highlight other ways that quality girls’ education can impact on climate 
change mitigation and adaptation: can enhance girls’ “green skills” that increases their resilience 
and adaptive capacity and prepares them for a potential in traditionally male-dominated green 
sector jobs; can increase girls’ opportunities for leadership and decision-making, both of which 
are highly correlated with pro-environmental and sustainable outcomes; an education that 
includes comprehensive sexuality, reproductive health, and puberty education with attention to 
issues of gender and power, can increase girls’ sexual and reproductive health and rights 
(SRHR) outcomes. Furthermore, Kwauk et al. (2019, p. 5) argue that “the achievement of 
universal girls’ education and girls’ rights would represent a fundamental, and progressive shift in 
the social fabric and global political economy currently fueling the climate crisis.”   
Education as part of a suite of measures aimed at (indirectly and directly) reducing population 
growth in Africa, “could help change mindsets and overcome the cultural obstacles to 
contraceptive use” (Dodson et al., 2020, p. 6). Family planning actually improves girls' access to 
 
11 See https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/  
12 Information taken from https://gain.nd.edu/assets/254377/nd_gain_technical_document_2015.pdf  
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education “by improving household finances and increasing parents' ability to invest in each 
child, reducing the need for girls to care for siblings at home, as well as avoiding teenage 
pregnancies” (Dodson et al., 2020, p. 6). But despite the apparent benefits of investing in girls’ 
education, climate action and financing have paid little attention to girls’ education as a cost-
effective strategy for tackling long-term climate action.  
Women’s empowerment 
Although the literature reviewed by Engelman et al. (2016, p. 17) “does not demonstrate directly 
that increased use of family planning contributes to environmental sustainability through women’s 
empowerment, some papers offer evidence that, cumulatively, can support that statement.” Of 
the 112 top-ranked papers, 11 document evidence for the value of gender equity and women’s 
empowerment in environmental outcomes.  
A study by Oyawole et al. (2020) assessed the effect of women’s empowerment on the adoption 
of climate-smart agricultural practices at the plot level in Nigeria. The study calculated the 
empowerment score for each plot manager, as well as the women empowerment gap for each 
household using the Abbreviated Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index methodology and 
using data from the ECOWAS-RAAFPASANAO survey conducted in Nigeria in 2017. Oyawole et 
al. (2020) results show that men are significantly more empowered than women in four out of the 
five domains of empowerment, while preliminary descriptive statistics indicate that female plot 
managers adopted the climate smart agricultural practices considered more than their male 
counterparts. Econometric results confirm that female plot managers have a higher likelihood of 
adopting green manure and agroforestry, while male plot mangers are more likely to adopt crop 
rotation. However, no significant gender differences in the adoption of organic manure use and 
zero/minimum tillage were found. They conclude that closing the empowerment gap would 
positively influence the adoption of climate smart agricultural practices in Nigeria, their results 
also add to the literature base on how gender differences influence technology adoption.  
FAO (2018) argues that all aspects of climate action should actively promote gender equality in 
climate responses. The paper highlights that gender equality was a principle objective of only 3% 
of Climate ODA in 2014, while 28% of it included gender equality as a secondary objective. 
There is strong focus on gender equality and women’s empowerment in the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development.  
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There is also the UNFCCC’s Gender Action Plan, which was adopted at COP23 in November 
2017 under the Lima work programme on gender. Gender equality is also mentioned in 75% of 
SSA’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) submissions to the Paris Agreement (FAO, 
2018, p. 9). The FAO (2018, p. 10) highlights that the “feminisation of agriculture” offers 
important untapped opportunities for closing the gender gap in agriculture for gender resilience. 
The empowerment of female farmers “can significantly contribute to building the household 
resilience to climate 
impacts,” with “Women’s 
ownership of productive 
assets [being] positively 
linked to their uptake of 
climate-smart practices and 
soil conservation 
techniques.” Awareness-
raising and access to 
information and knowledge 
about climate-smart 
agriculture options for 
women is important, and will 
lead “to greater uptake of 
these technologies and 
practices, and enhance the 
resilience of entire 
households and 
communities and food 
systems to climate-related 
shocks and changes” (FAO, 
2018, p. 10 – see Box 1 for 
a country example). 
Family planning and reproductive health 
1. Possible physiological effects of climate change  
Grace (2017, p. 479) argues that “Factors related to fertility such as population size, composition 
and rate of growth may influence a community’s ability to adapt to a changing climate and must 
also be brought into the discussion of future scenarios.” But how climate change may impact on 
human fertility and reproductive health over time and space in poor countries is not well 
understood. Grace (2017, p. 479) highlights that climate change (through precipitation changes, 
extreme heat, extreme weather events, seasonality changes etc.) can impact (indirectly or 
directly) on changes in sexual behaviour and coital frequency, sperm quality, birth and fertility 
goals and planning, psychological well-being, general maternal and child health, and access to 
health services. Although there is limited research that explores these links between climate and 
human fertility and reproductive health outcomes in poor, rural women in poor countries (or for 
the wider population), Grace (2017, p. 480) argues that an empirical understanding of these links 
is important for understanding “processes underlying fertility changes and differences within and 
Box 1: FAO Nap-Ag programme – Uganda 
FAO supports countries in integrating gender issues into their 
National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) through the Nap-Ag 
Programme. The programme provides technical trainings on 
gender analysis and mainstreaming in adaptation planning; 
incorporates of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis 
into agriculture censuses and impact evaluations; as well as 
tools for countries to promote women’s empowerment and 
climate resilience in agricultural value chain development.  
Uganda was one of the Nap-Ag pilot countries. The 
programme has assisted Uganda to finalise their NAP 
framework for the agricultural sectors, which was launched in 
2018. Some other highlights of NAP-Ag work in Uganda 
include: sensitization of technical staff and public service 
providers on NAPs; and training and stock-taking of decision 
tools for prioritizing investment options and assessing climate 
impact. 
Source: FAO, 2018, p. 11; http://www.fao.org/in-
action/naps/partner-countries/uganda/en/  
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across communities and are instrumental in the development and application of public health 
strategies focused on supporting women and families in poor countries.”  
Grace (2017, p. 480) characterise key (indirect and direct) links between climate and human 
fertility and reproductive health outcomes in poor countries under the following headings: time 
use and physical labour, nutrition and food security, and resource stability and income. 
Meaningful micro-level (household-level, community-level) research including climate in human 
fertility and reproductive health studies is needed to better explore these areas. Grace (2017) 
recommends that human fertility and reproductive health research in SSA should also focus on 
incorporating questions that can help to capture variation in how individuals use their time and 
how they respond to weather changes. Analyses like these, Grace (2017, p. 484) concludes, can 
support and inform the development of relevant policies on contraceptive use (and unmet 
contraceptive need) and food insecurity etc. This is particularly important in SSA, to better 
understand apparent stalls in fertility transitions, low use of contraception and high childbearing 
goals.  
Eissler et al (2019) use 40 rounds of Demographic and Health Survey data from 18 SSA 
countries, linked to historical climate records, to analyse the relationship between climatic 
variability and fertility goals among reproductive-aged women. Their findings suggest that 
“women exposed to adverse environmental conditions—namely abnormally hot or dry spells—
will reduce their ideal family size and their preferences for having another child. In some cases, 
however, fertility goals may also decline during spells of favourable environmental conditions, 
possibly due to increased labour demands among women and their spouses.” Although the 
magnitude of the association is not large it is according to the authors “non-trivial.” Eissler et al. 
(2019, p. 10) argue that the policy relevance of their findings is potentially important for helping to 
understand the myriad of ways in which individuals and households adapt or fail to adapt to 
climate change, suggestion that “adaptation may also involve ideational changes that could affect 
behaviour throughout women’s reproductive years.” They also suggest that increasing resources 
for family planning could be a useful component of climate change adaptation.  
2. Benefits of family planning and reproductive health 
Regions of high population growth, high fertility, and high unmet need for family planning overlap 
with regions of high vulnerability to climate change. Ongoing unmet need for family planning in 
these regions can exacerbate vulnerability and make it more difficult for individuals, households, 
and communities to adapt. A policy brief by Mogelgaard and Patterson (2018, p. 1) for Population 
Reference Bureau, summarises some of the key short- and long-term benefits that meeting 
women’s needs for family planning and reproductive health has for climate change adaptation 
efforts and promoting resilience:  
• Women and their children are healthier—a fundamental building block of resilience to 
climate change impacts.  
• Women become more empowered (fewer caregiving demands means women are more 
likely to continue education and/or engage in the labour force and other activities), 
opening up greater possibilities for them to effectively engage in adaptation efforts. 
These outcomes can also lead to improved earnings that a woman can use to improve 
the resilience of her household to shocks.  
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• Couples who are able to avoid unintended pregnancies tend to have smaller families, 
limiting household demand on climate-sensitive resources like food and water.  
• Slower population growth reduces pressure on the local natural resource base and 
results in fewer people exposed to climate hazards. 
The brief argues that the best opportunity for funding family planning and reproductive health 
within adaptation projects is to integrate women's empowerment—including family planning—
within multisectoral proposals (Mogelgaard & Patterson, 2018). Gender equitable policies that 
eliminate barriers to contraceptive use should be complemented with expanded family planning 
programmes that provide universal access to all types of safe, effective contraception. The 
benefits of family planning must be emphasised and recognised as an investment. See Box 2 for 
an example of USAID integrating a family planning component into an existing resilience 
programme.  
Box 2: Building Resilience through Strengthening and Integrating Reproductive Health and 
Family Planning in Niger (RISE-FP): USAID 
In 2017, the Evidence to Action (E2A) Project (2011–present), with support from USAID, launched 
“Building Resilience through Strengthening and Integrating Reproductive Health and Family 
Planning in Niger” (RISE-FP) in the Sahel to integrate quality family planning (FP) programming into 
the 2014-RISE initiative. RISE is a multi-partner initiative focused on building the resilience of 
chronically vulnerable households in targeted agro-pastoral and marginal agriculture zones in Niger 
and Burkina Faso through economic empowerment, strengthening governance, and improving 
health and nutrition.  
As part of the RISE-FP project, E2A proposed to pilot and document an innovative integrated FP 
and resilience intervention built on the concepts of integration and partnership between the health 
and non-health sectors. The intervention theorised that “by increasing information about and the 
availability of health services—including FP and nutrition—as well as agriculture services 
(conservation farming), to a wider range of people in the communities, the resiliency of more 
households will increase, making households better able to withstand changes to their social, 
economic, and environmental systems.” Integrated FP/RH and conservation farming activities by 
community-based distributors and conservation farmer group leaders took place in 13 villages in the 
Zinder region between September 2018 through June 2019. 
The policy brief argues that although the intervention was relatively small in scale, its significance is 
substantial. The findings show promise for expanding access to family planning and may increase 
uptake of conservation farming practices, which would ultimately increase community resilience. 
These findings reinforce the evidence from PHE literature indicating that such partnerships and 
integrated information are often successful at reaching men with FP information, and may 
encourage more supportive attitudes toward FP. Results could produce synergy for household food 
security, health, and nutrition—and thereby resilience—across the Sahel, particularly for vulnerable 
women and children. 
Source: USAID & E2A, 2019 
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Population-Health-Environment (PHE) and multi-sector 
programmes13 
There is a burgeoning literature on “Population, Health, and Environment” (PHE), which is a 
development approach or model characterised by the integration of voluntary family planning 
(FP), health care, and natural resource management into a single suite of project activities.14 
Whilst these may not always be explicitly aimed at climate change, there are links, especially 
around resilience-building.  
A review by Lopez-Carr and Ervin (2017) using evidence from USAID-sponsored programmes in 
Africa and Asia, explore whether combined population-health-environment initiatives provide 
synergies above and beyond more traditional singular efforts (NB: environment is often 
associated with conservation efforts). They emphasise that there is scant scholarly evidence on 
the effectiveness of integrated PHE initiatives, and so they aim to add to this body by exploring 
the potential effectiveness of integrated PHE investments for conservation outcomes. The study 
conducted expert interviews and used data from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) designated high 
priority marine and terrestrial conservation sites with USAID-sponsored PHE programmes in the 
Philippines, Nepal, India, Mozambique, Madagascar, Kenya, Cameroon and the Central African 
Republic. Lopez-Carr and Ervin (2017, p. 92) conclude that “Quantitative and qualitative results 
indicate diverse, and in some cases dramatic, improvements in maternal and child health and 
conservation measures that overall appeared to benefit from the integrative PHE approach.”  
They also emphasise the importance of promoting PHE interventions within the framework of 
livelihood improvement. Cultural sensitivity and local buy-in were also key to success, as was 
effective collaboration with health partners. See Box 3 on the next page for an evaluation of the 
USAID Health of the People and Environment in the Lake Victoria Basin (HoPE-LVB) programme 
in Uganda and Kenya. 
 
13 Many of the case studies given in this section are taken from the Population Reference Bureau’s Population, 
Health, Environment, and Development Activity Map [last updated 22/10/2019] – see 
https://www.prb.org/population-health-environment-activity-map/   
14 See https://toolkits.knowledgesuccess.org/toolkits/population-health-environment-toolkit/why-phe  




A study by Hardee et al. (2018) uses 2016 household survey data from western Tanzania from 
the Tuungane integrated PHE project to quantify the link between resilience and family planning 
(see Box 4 for more information on the Tanzania project). The analysis finds that the association 
between family planning and maternal and child health, and resilience is robust across a range of 
factors and broadly related to the construct of resilience. Their analysis supports the importance 
of including family planning and maternal and child health in the design and implementation of 
Box 3: Health of the People and Environment in the Lake Victoria Basin (HoPE-LVB): 
USAID 
An evaluation from 2018 examines the evidence on the effectiveness and scalability of the 
HoPE-LVB model of integrated population, health, and environment (PHE) community 
development in Kenya and Uganda. A USAID funded project that ran from 2011-2017, the 
project aimed to increase access to sexual and reproductive health services and improve 
maternal and child health care practices while reducing threats to biodiversity conservation in 
project communities. 
Stakeholders consistently perceived that HoPE-LVB’s PHE model added value. Positive 
outcomes were also found from institutionalisation, sustainability, and expansion of the 
model. In particular, the evaluation notes that the degree to which PHE practices spread 
organically to neighbouring communities and across regions through site visits and meetings 
was striking (although acknowledges there is considerable potential for further adoption). The 
evaluation found that “the key value the HoPE-LVB project added was its capacity to make 
people appreciate the relationship between population, health, and environment. Informants 
highlighted that HoPE-LVB significantly changed the quality of life among people in the 
project’s areas of jurisdiction in both Uganda and Kenya, including populations traditionally 
more set in their ways.” Family planning was highlighted as being a key aspect that 
influenced most people in the intervention communities; with family planning training helping 
to influence the number of children in the target communities. More women were also 
involved in income-generating activities and their bargaining power in the household had also 
improved. 
The evaluation notes some key factors in the project: 
• The importance of women’s central role in PHE solutions.  
• While the context (ecological, cultural, political, economic) will change across diverse 
geographies, the core message remains universal of the relationship between 
population, health, and environment.  
• Successful PHE expansion will identify champions and key stakeholders at different 
scales and across thematic areas.  
• Strategic messaging will retain the core PHE message, which has proven effective 
when tailored to the local context.  
• Model households and exchange visits were paramount in demonstrating the PHE 
concept and providing living laboratories.  
Source: López-Carr et al., 2018 
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integrated, multisectoral projects to enhance resilience. The study notes that it was a first of its 
kind, and therefore it had some limitations, such as the components used to define resilience 
may not be complete. The authors urge the need for further research into replication of these 
measures with other data sources and further refinement.  
Cooper Hall (2018) in a policy brief for the Population Reference Bureau explores the potential to 
expand the use of Family Planning High Impact Practices (HIPs) in PHE projects. HIPs are a set 
of evidence-based practices that improve family planning and reproductive health programme 
outcomes. PHEs are typically located in remote communities where unmet need for family 
planning is often high. When PHE projects use HIPs in their work, they can direct their family 
planning resources more effectively to achieve greater impact. Most PHE projects already carry 
out activities that align with elements of select HIPs, especially HIPs in the Enabling Environment 
category through policy work with decisionmakers. To strengthen the impact of their activities, 
PHE projects should strategically consider how to leverage the HIPs they currently implement 
and explore opportunities to strengthen their projects by using additional HIPs. A case study 
used by Cooper Hall (2018) to demonstrate the value added of HIPs to a PHE project can be 
seen in Box 4.   
 
Box 4: Tuungane integrated population, health, and environment (PHE) project in 
Tanzania  
The Tuungane PHE project is led by Pathfinder International and The Nature Conservancy in 
24 remote villages beside Lake Tanganyika in an ecologically rich area of western Tanzania. 
The project aims to improve access to reproductive health services while also assisting 
community members to better manage natural resources to ensure their livelihoods are 
sustainable and their community is healthy using a cross-sector approach. Analyses of the 
2011 baseline and 2016 midline quantitative data, and additional qualitative data from 2016, 
measured the project’s progress and shed light on the contribution of the project interventions 
to building resilience, and on the links between family planning and other components of 
resilience. After four years, the Tuungane Project made progress toward increasing resilience 
on key indicators relating to population, family planning, and reproductive health. Progress 
was made in social cohesion-participation; natural resources protection attitudes; food 
security and assets; water, sanitation, and hygiene; climate change awareness; and family 
planning and access to health care. It was noted that regarding respondents’ attitudes to 
population and family planning, while most people still desire large families, they understand 
and value family planning for its ability to improve maternal and child health. 
The Tuungane project found that although access to and use of contraception has increased 
in the project area, desired family size has not changed. Increasing knowledge about 
comprehensive reproductive health services and facilitating dialogues about optimal birth 
spacing for family health and prosperity could help community norms evolve. Strengthening 
Tuungane’s social and behaviour change activities may enhance these efforts (i.e. through 
using lessons from the Social and Behaviour Change HIPs).  
Sources: Patterson, 2018; Cooper Hall, 2018; Hardee et al., 2018. 
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7. Climate policies 
Family planning and education reflected in climate policies 
The link between population and GHG emissions has been the topic of a large literature. 
However, it appears that policymakers seem to almost ignore the effects of policy on population 
size, and there is little attention by the international community to the potential of population-
related policies to reduce risks from climate change (Arrhenius et al., 2020; Dodson et al., 2020). 
On the other hand, population policy “can only be applicable to climate policy if it can influence 
population growth rates, at acceptable costs and without other undesirable consequences” 
(Scovronick et al., 2017, SI Appendix, p.9). There is also general awareness of key population, 
climate change and gender challenges among policymakers in Africa, as well as the need to link 
and integrate the two issues at policy and programme levels. However, there is limited 
prioritisation of population issues in broader development policies and strategies (Aura et al., 
2017). 
O’Sullivan (2018, p. 119) notes the literature that emphasises that the effects of population 
change in SSA “dwarf the likely impacts of climate change on food and water security and on 
environmental damage.” A population-focused voluntary family planning approach would be 
alongside a suite of other emissions reducing avenues. However, it is generally excluded from 
the UNFCCC discourse. O’Sullivan (2018) highlights that discussions of the risk population 
growth poses to heightened climate change impacts is considered taboo by the UN and 
development community since the adoption of the Cairo Agenda (i.e. the UN Programme of 
Action) at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, which called for 
the emphasis of reproductive health and rights over demographic aims. As a result, funding for 
reproductive health issues (e.g., maternal care, safe delivery, sexually transmitted diseases, and 
female genital cutting) rose and funding for family planning programmes declined in the 1990s 
and 2000s (Bongaarts & O’Neill, 2018).  
Hardee and Mutunga (2010) review the National Adaptation Plans for Action (NAPAs) prepared 
by least-developed countries during the UNFCCC’s 2009 climate adaptation agenda. They found 
that 37 out of 41 NAPAs highlighted population growth and density as factors increasing 
vulnerability to climate change. Moreover, six NAPAs (the Comoros, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kiribati, 
Uganda and Zambia) clearly state that slowing population growth or investments in reproductive 
health/family planning should be considered among the country’s priority adaptation actions. 
Only one of these six (Uganda) actually proposes a project with components of reproductive 
health/family planning among their priority adaptation interventions, and none were funded. The 
UNFCCC guidelines lacked appropriate categories in which population action could be presented 
as valid climate action.  
A more recent analysis from 2018 looked at the mention of SRHR in the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris agreement. Brok (2018, p. 1) from the DFPA screened the 
NDCs “for references to analyses and action related to population, fertility rates, family planning, 
and SRHR.” Out of 190 NDCs available at the time, 164 were screened as the study was limited 
to the NDCs available in English and some countries have shared NDCs e.g. the EU. The study 
found that only seven NDCs mention SRHR (such as voluntary family planning), even though 
around a third link climate change and population growth. Predominantly low and lower middle 
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income countries express concern about the links between changes in climate and a growing 
population.  
A recent analysis of 160 NDCs and 13 National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) by Kwuak et al. (2019) 
looking at whether climate strategies include adequate attention to social protection and 
inclusion/ empowerment of vulnerable groups and girls’ education, conclude that they do not. 
Within the analysis, “only one country’s NDC makes a reference to girls’ education and two 
additional countries refer to girls explicitly, a reflection of a larger omission of children/youth and 
education in climate strategies. Only 67 of 160 NDCs include a direct reference to children or 
youth and only eight to intergenerational injustice or future generations. [The] top 20 carbon 
emitting countries were least focused on education and children” (Kwauk et al., 2019, p. (3)). 
Furthermore the countries that “do attend to issues of intergenerational equity tend to be “young” 
countries—countries with a large under-15 population—and climate-vulnerable countries” 
(Kwauk et al., 2019, p. (3)). NDCs and other climate strategies tend to be focused on technical 
solutions and ignore sociological concerns, and where sociological concerns are considered this 
tends to focus on the politics of the economic state (i.e. politics between high income countries 
and low and middle income countries) and omit space for challenging social power structures 
(including gender). Kwuak et al. (2019, p. 26) emphasise that “the inclusion of girls’ rights in 
national climate strategies can have mutual benefits for both climate action and gender equality.” 
Organisations promoting the role of SRHR in climate change 
approaches 
Some key organisations and alliances are working to promote the role of SRHR in climate 
change approaches and sustainable development in international fora. For example the 
Population & Sustainable Development Alliance (PSDA)15 works to strengthen and promote 
intersectoral approaches to sustainable development that encompass SRHR, maternal and child 
health, water and sanitation, livelihood diversification, food security, gender equality, community-
based natural resource management, environmental protection and climate change resilience. 
PSDA was established and is chaired by the Danish Family Planning Association (DFPA) and 
made up of a community of member organisations (mostly CSOs). Engage with decision makers 
at international conferences across the globe, sharing evidence from peer-reviewed literature 
and the community-based work of PSDA members.  
Mogelgaard and Patterson (2018) argue that with increasing focus on adaptation there is a 
growing opportunity for family planning to be included as part of multisectoral climate adaptation 
projects. However, family planning has not yet broadly been incorporated into projects funded by 
multilateral finance institutions. International climate finance institutions such as the Green 
Climate Fund (GCF) and the Adaptation Fund, are increasingly supporting climate change 
adaptation. Questions have risen about what counts as adaptation activities as this financial 
support has grown. However, according to Mogelgaard and Patterson (2018), none of the main 
multilateral adaptation funds have supported family planning efforts within their portfolios. On the 
other hand, none of their investment frameworks contain explicit prohibitions against doing so. 
Bilateral donors are also funding programmes that combine family planning with other climate 
actions. For example, see Box 5 for an example of REDD+ funding family planning interventions.  
 
15 https://psda.international/ 




Sensitivities and debates 
A key sensitivity in the issues around population growth and climate change is that voluntary 
family planning programmes are largely aimed at high-fertility low and middle income countries, 
with relatively low per capita emissions, “while people in the developed world, which is primarily 
responsible for causing the climate to change, continue their excessive emission of greenhouse 
gases” (Bongaarts & O'Neill, 2018, p. 652). This highlights a key concern of many in the climate 
change community, a conversation that “blames the poor countries for problems created by the 
rich countries” (Bongaarts & O'Neill, 2018, p. 652). The call for a human rights–based approach 
(i.e. for women everywhere to have the right to freely choose when and how often to get 
pregnant) helps somewhat to move past these concerns. However, although there is 
widespread agreement among governments and international organisations that family 
planning programmes are a valuable investment” they are often given low priority as they 
are considered a “health investment rather than an investment with wide-ranging 
socioeconomic and environmental benefits” (Bongaarts & O'Neill, 2018, p. 652). 
Box 5: Norway & CAFI/FONAREDD DRC programme on Scaling up family planning  
The Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI) launched in 2015, supports strategic, holistic and 
country-level REDD+ and Low Emission Development investments while focusing on Central 
African high-forest cover countries (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the DRC, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo).  
Since 2012 the DRC has established a REDD+ National Fund (French acronym, 
FONAREDD), CAFI funds have capitalised FONAREDD and are channelled through it. To 
date sixteen programmes have been approved, together totalling over US$ 140 million of 
CAFI capital. Five of the CAFI /FONAREDD-funded provincial integrated programmes, 
covering 8 provinces, have integrated demography activities and targets over the next 5 years 
aimed at reducing demographic pressure on forests. This includes a specific programme on 
Scaling up family planning (PROMIS-PF its French acronym). Running from 2019 to 
2022 (potential to extend to 2025), it is implemented by Tulane University, Marie Stopes 
International and DKT International with supplies from UNFPA and UNOPS, and is 
funded by CAFI (US$ 8 million) and Norway (US$ 25 million). It aims to reduce the 
effects of unplanned demographic growth on forests, supporting 193 health centres 
and 8 Million Couple Years of Protection, and also increase by 1.5% each year the 
services and inputs (such as contraceptives) in the eight provinces covered by REDD+ 
Integrated programmes. More specific programme information is only available in French.  
Sources: https://www.cafi.org/content/cafi/en/home/our-work/our-results/demography.html; 
https://www.cafi.org/content/cafi/en/home/partner-countries/democratic-republic-of-the-
congo/drc-fonaredd-programmes.html; http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00116875 [in 
French]  
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A growing group of scholars question 
and challenge what they see as 
“population control’s current 
manifestations” and the “the continued 
prevalence of population control 
ideology, with attendant population 
alarmism, in sustainable development 
and climate change approaches” 
(Hendrixson et al., 2020, p. 308).  
Hendrixson et al. (2020, p. 312) argue 
that these manifestations of population 
control “restrict bodies, reinforce 
boundaries, and create spaces of 
exclusion and violence” and “These 
practices dismiss social justice and 
human rights goals and agendas or 
instrumentalize them.” This 
demonstrates the ongoing, complex 
debates, discourses, sensitivities and 
ethical concerns that remain.   
Future research 
There is a recognised need for further 
research into population and climate 
change connections, and donors are 
starting to react to this (see for example 
Box 6). Dodson et al. (2020) highlight 
the need for more basic and applied 
research into population-related fields in 
order to create the most effective 
policies, especially around the efficacy 
of national population-related policies in 
the context of climate impacts. Given 
the general move away from support to 
population-focused voluntary family 
planning programmes since the early 
1990s in international development, the 
research into the efficacy of national 
policies and the contraceptive needs for 
different scenarios has declined. A 
better understanding of the impact of 
different population trajectories within 
countries on expected climate impacts, 
such as food security, water security etc 
is needed. Cross-sectoral collaborative 
research with family planning and 
reproductive health professionals is also 
Box 6: Population Council’s Contributing to the 
Sustainable Development Goals by Investing in 
Adolescent Girls and Young Women: Danida 
Denmark has placed sexual and reproductive health 
and rights of women and girls at the centre of their 
international work and priorities. The World 2030 – 
Denmark’s strategy for development cooperation and 
humanitarian action recognises the need “to reverse 
the global population trend and turn the development 
around from being a challenge and a potential threat 
to being an opportunity and a resource.” In 2020, 
Denmark allocated DKK 755 million to global efforts 
for sexual and reproductive health and rights, 
including efforts focusing on women and girls in 
humanitarian crises and conflicts. As part of this 
contribution, Danida initiated a cooperation with the 
organisation Population Council in 2020 with a focus 
on population growth, youth, and climate change.   
The Population Council’s programme, Contributing to 
the Sustainable Development Goals by Investing in 
Adolescent Girls and Young Women (AGYW), will run 
from July 2020 to December 2022, with a focus on 
girls in SSA. The Population Council will undertake a 
body of inter-disciplinary research to deliver three 
complementary outputs that together will: increase 
understanding of the population, health, development, 
economic and environmental impacts of more 
widespread and intentional investments in AGYW; 
equip national and global decision makers with the 
right kind evidence to guide investments; and, 
address the evidence gaps in climate and population 
research. Key outputs include the development of an 
evidence-based framework outlining opportunities on 
how to optimize adolescents’ transitions to adulthood 
in order to accelerate progress for adolescents, their 
families, and communities, including the influence of 
education and family planning on fertility rates. An 
Adolescent Atlas for Action – an online analytical tool 
– expanded to 15 ODA countries for better data and 
evidence use for investment in adolescents. 
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 
2019; Population Council, 2020; 
https://um.dk/en/danida-
en/strategies%20and%20priorities/  
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needed to determine the appropriate methods and response. Documenting the vulnerability 
reduction benefits that come with greater access to family planning is also needed. Finally, “More 
studies are needed that not only include actions to lower fertility, but also couple human and 
natural systems. To facilitate this, there should be more collaboration between social scientists 
experienced in reproductive health and population policy and climate scientists” (Dodson et al., 
2020, p. 7). 
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